Abstract. A general strategy for proving completeness theorems for quantified modal logics is provided. Starting from free quantified modal logic K, with or without identity, extensions obtained either by adding the principle of universal instantiation or the converse of the Barcan formula or the Barcan formula are considered and proved complete in a uniform way. Completeness theorems are also shown for systems with the extended Barcan rule as well as for some quantified extensions of the modal logic B. The incompleteness of Q
In this paper we consider all free and classical quantified extensions of the propositional modal logic K obtained by adding either the axioms of identity or the Converse of the Barcan Formula or the Barcan Formula or the Extended Barcan Rule. Quantified extensions of the propositional logic B are also examined. 1 The lack of "... a common completeness proof that can cover constant domains, varying domains, and models meeting other conditions..." has often been felt, see [3] , p.132. In [4] and [5] , p.273, we read "Ideally, we would like to find a completely general completeness proof." The production of such a proof is the aim of this paper. We proceed by presenting a completeness proof for the system Q • .K, Kripke's original one 2 with the addition of individual constants, we then show that such a proof yields completeness results for extensions of Q
• .K such as those characterized by models with increasing or constant domains, with or without non-existing objects, with or without identity. Our main goal is to offer a clear framework in which each completeness result considered, old or new, will find its natural place. Sometimes we will follow through the proof of a known result just to show how it fits into our framework. In the first part of the paper we will deal with the systems mentioned in the diagram below:
In the second part we will consider systems containing the identity relation. As we will see, Q
• .K (Q.K) is obtained by adding to the normal propositional modal logic K the quantificational axioms and rules of free (classical) logic. The main feature of Q
• .K is that the principle of Universal Instantiation, U I, is not a theorem, but only its universal closure, U I
• , is. Semantically this fact has the important consequence that each world w of a model for Q
• .K is endowed both with an inner domain, D w , that represents the set of objects existing at w and coincides with the domain of variation of the quantifiers, and with an outer domain U w ⊇ D w that also contains non-existing possible objects and coincides with the domain of interpretation at w of the variables, the predicates and the individual constants. Once the full axiom of Universal Instantiation is present, no distinction is made between existing and non-existing objects and only one domain is associated with each world. Here are the four formulas we shall be most concerned with:
U I
• ∀y(∀xA(x) → A(y/x)) U I ∀xA(x) → A(t/x) CBF 2∀xA → ∀x2A BF ∀x2A → 2∀xA §1. Modal systems without identity.
First Order Modal Languages and Kripke Semantics. The alphabet of first-order modal language L (without identity) contains the unary connective 2 (box) in addition to the Boolean connectives ¬ (not) and ∨ (or) and the quantifier ∃ (there is). Moreover L contains a countable set, Var, of variables, x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , the symbol of falsehood, ⊥, and the following two sets, at most countable, of, respectively, individual constants a, b, c, d, a 1 , b 1 , c 1 , d 1 , . . . , and predicate symbols, P n , Q n , R n , . . . of arity n, 0 ≤ n < ω. A term is either a variable or an individual constant. s, s 1 , s 2 , ... t, t 1 , t 2 , ... are metavariables for terms.
Well formed formulas (wffs) 1.
⊥ is a wff, 2.
If P n is an n-ary predicate symbol and t 1 , . . . , t n are n terms, then P n (t 1 , . . . , t n ) is a wff, 3.
If A and B are wffs and x is a variable, then ¬A, 2A, A ∨ B, ∃xA are wffs, 4 .
Nothing else is a well formed formula.
The formulas A∧B, A → B, 3A, ∀xA are defined in the usual way. By A(t/s) we denote the formula obtained from the wff A(s) by replacing all free occurrences of s by t, changing the name of bound variables, if necessary, to avoid rendering the new occurrences of t bound in A(t/s). A(t//s) denotes that some (all, When no condition is imposed on the domain function D, F is said to have varying domains, when wRv implies
, F is said to have increasing (decreasing, constant) domains. The outer domains are always increasing.
A K-model M is given by a K-frame F plus a function I that together with every w ∈ W determines an interpretation I w of the descriptive symbols of the language. In particular,
n and I w (c) ∈ U w .
Whenever M = F, I , M is said to be based on F. For each w ∈ W , a wassignment is a function σ : V ar → U w . Let σ and τ be two w-assignments. τ is said to be an x-variant of σ if σ and τ agree on all variables except possibly on the variable x. If σ is a w-assignment, it is also a v-assignment for any v such that wRv, because U w ⊆ U v . Given a w-assignment σ, we can interpret all terms of the language, by letting I σ w (c) = I w (c) and I σ w (x) = σ(x). The notion of a formula being satisfied by a w-assignment σ at w in a K-model M is defined so:
M |= A formula B is valid on a K-frame F, F |= B, iff for all K-models M based on F, M |= B. A formula B is K-valid iff for all K-frames F, F |= B. M is a model for a logic L iff M |= A, for all theorems A of L.
As is well-known, the following formulas are not K-valid:
Denotation, existence and rigidity. In the K-semantics just introduced, every constant is denoting, in fact for all w ∈ W and for all constants c, I w (c) is defined, but nothing is said about whether it denotes an existing or a nonexisting individual, I w (c) can be in D w as well as in (U w -D w ). Moreover it is not assumed that constants are rigid designators, where an individual constant c is said to be a rigid designator iff
In a language without identity no formula expresses that a constant is a rigid designator. At the semantical level, rigidity corresponds to the classical correlation between satisfaction and substitution as stated by the following lemma.
, for any wassignment τ which is an x-variant of σ such that τ (x) = I w (c). , where τ is a v-assignment and an x-variant of σ such that τ (x) = I v (c). Since c is a rigid designator, τ (x) = I w (c), whence τ is a w-assignment and so M |= τ w 2B(x). Suppose c is not a rigid designator. Take a model M based on two worlds w and v such that wRv, moreover let A particular case of Kripke semantics which has been widely studied in the literature is the one we will call Tarski-Kripke semantics, T K-semantics, in order to stress the fact that a Tarski-Kripke model is just a family of classical models interconnected by the accessibility relation. A T K-frame is a K-frame in which for all w ∈ W , U w = D w , so each world w is endowed with just one domain, D w , which is both the domain of variation of the quantifiers, of the free variables and the domain of interpretation of the constant and predicate symbols. Of course D w = ∅ and wRv implies that D w ⊆ D v . T K-models are defined exactly as Kmodels. Each world of a T K-model is a Tarskian model, and so classically valid formulas such as ∀xA(x) → A(x) or ∀xA(x) → A(c/x) or ∀xA(x) → ∃xA(x) turn out to be valid. Moreover CBF and GF are T K-valid too. On the contrary BF and CGF are not T K-valid.
A comparison with the semantics as presented in Kripke, 1963 .
We will use the expression original Kripke semantics, OK-semantics, to refer to the semantics of Kripke, [7] , 1963. An OK-model is a quadruple W, R, D, I where W , R and D are defined as in K-semantics. The interpretation function I, on the other hand, differs for now I is such that I w (P n ) ⊆ V and I w (c) ∈ V , where V = w∈W D w . Analogously, the codomain of any assignment function is V . At first sight, OK-models look more general than K-models because both the assignment and the interpretation functions are not world-bound, in the sense that the interpretation at w of, say, a unary predicate P need not be a subset of D w , and the interpretation at w of a constant c need not be an element of D w . A way of looking at this semantics is that each world has an 'inner' domain, D w , the domain of variation of the quantifiers, that varies from world to world and can be empty, and an 'outer' domain, V , which remains fixed and is the domain of interpretation of the variables, the predicates and the individual constants. V is the global domain of discourse, the set of all things of which we are entitled to say at each world if a predicate is true or false of them at that world. Moreover each element of V is bound to exist in some world. Keeping the outer domain V fixed is a heavy limitation in building canonical models, for suppose that we want to define a model based on a frame with two worlds, w and v, and that we want to define first D w and I w and then, D v and I v . In defining the function I w , we are bound to establish once and for all what the set V is like, so that there will be no way to add new individuals when we come to define either D v or I v . A further and most important advantage of K-semantics is that T Kmodels are particular cases of K-models, just let U w = D w . This is particularly relevant in the present context since we aim at a unique semantic framework that can accommodate both OK-models and T K-models. 5 This has induced us to generalize OK-semantics by allowing the outer domains to increase and at the same time to have world-bound interpretations and assignment functions. But this is no limitation because in K-semantics, as we have defined it, the codomain of I w as well as of any w-assignment is U w , the outer domain, and nothing prevents each U w from including w∈W D w .
The system Q
• .K and some of its extensions.
The system Q • .K contains the following axioms and inference rules.
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Axiom schemata: truth-functional tautologies,
Inference rules : Modus Ponens (from A and A → B infer B), Necessitation (from A infer 2A), and Universal Generalization (from A infer ∀xA).
The system Q.K is just the system Q • .K with ∀y(∀xA(x) → A(y/x)) replaced by ∀xA(x) → A(t/x).
A proof in L is a sequence of formulas such that each of them is either an axiom of L or it is obtained from preceding formulas in the sequence by application of an inference rule. A wff A is a theorem of L, L A,iff there is a proof in L whose last formula is A. A wff A is derivable in L from a set ∆ of formulas, ∆ L A, iff for some finite number of formulas
• .K that we will use in the sequel (often without mentioning them). 
, where y is not free in B.
∀xA ↔ ∀yA(y/x), where y doesn't occur in ∀xA. is sound w.r.t. the class of K-frames with domains inner outer
Completeness results
The main idea behind the completeness proof we are going to present stems from a simple observation: the affinity of meaning between CBF and U I. Take an instance of U I, ∀xP (x) → P (x). The falsity at a world w of ∀xP (x) → P (x) under a w-assignment σ, implies that the individual σ(x) does not belong to the domain of variation of the quantifiers, so σ(x) does not exist at w. The falsity of an instance of CBF , 2∀xP (x) → ∀x2P (x), at a world w implies that ∀xP (x) is true at some future moment v, whereas P (x) is false at v under some w-assignment σ such that σ(x) ∈ D w , and so at v under σ it is false that 7 To rule out empty domains add to Q • .K the axiom ∀xA → A, where x is not free in A.
∀xP (x) → P (x). U I discriminates between existing and non-existing individuals in the current world, whereas CBF discriminates between existing and nonexisting individuals in future worlds. Falsifying CBF has fatal consequences for some individual: any u which is a witness for ∃x3¬P (x) at a world w where 2∀xP (x) is true, is bound to die in some subsequent world. This induces us to stipulate that an individual constant c denotes an existing individual at w iff for all sentences ∀xA(x), ∀xA(x) → A(c/x) is true at w.
So, no wonder that validity of CBF yields that existing individuals never die. We would like to stress that in this way we are able to distinguish between existing and non-existing individuals without having recourse to the identity relation (or the existence predicate), as is usually the case, c denotes an existing individual at w iff ∃x(x = c) is true at w, and so without becoming entangled in problems linked to identity, modalities and rigid designators.
Notational convention. By L we shall denote any q.m.l. which extends
with language L and C is a denumerable set of individual constants not occurring in L, then L C denotes the language obtained by adding all the constants of C to L, and L C denotes the logic L in the language L C . From now on we agree that L is the language of L and L C is the language of L C . Moreover, Const(L) denotes the set of individual constants of L.
Note. It might well be that a set of sentences ∆ is L-consistent and at the same time ∆ L ∀u 1 . . . ∀u k ⊥, for some k ≥ 1. Take ∆ = {∀xA ∧ ¬A}, where x does not occcur in A or ∆ = {∀x⊥}.
If ∆ is an L-consistent set of sentences and no constant of
Proof. (i) As for classical logic, by choosing variables w 1 , . . . , w n not occurring in the proof D of A(c 1 , . . . , c n ) and by replacing uniformly in D, c i by
(ii) follows from (i), and (iii) from (ii).
Let C be a not-empty set of individual constants. Now we define a set of sentences, which if true, guarantee that C is a set of constants denoting 'existing' individuals.
Lemma 1.8. Let C be a not-empty set of constants. If ∆ is an L-consistent set of sentences and no constants of C occur in ∆, then either
Proof. Assume that ∆ L C ∀z 1 ...∀z h ⊥, for any h ≥ 1 and suppose by reduc-
(By E i ( c) we mean that the constants of C actually occuring in E i are among c 1 , . . . , c n .) If n = 0 then j = 0 too, and so ∆ would be L-inconsistent, contrary to the hypothesis. If n ≥ 1, let z = z 1 . . . z n be variables not occurring in (*), so by lemma 1.6(i),
, for some 1 ≤ l ≤ n and wff A( z, x) (z l may or may not occur in ∀xA), so by lemma
When the principle of Universal Instantiation is present, lemma 1.8 is nothing but lemma 1.6(iii).
Proof. First observe that since C = ∅, all vacuous universal instantiations ∀xB → B, where x doesn't occur free in B, are derivable from E(C). In fact let (x) be any tautology containing the free variable
. . , z n , z be variables not occurring in (*), so by lemma 1.6(i),
by Modus Ponens with sentences of E(C) or with vacuous universal instantiations (derivable from
When the principle of Universal Instantiation is present, lemma 1.9 is an immediate corollary of lemma 1.6(i).
iff ∆ is L-maximal and for some set Q ⊆ Const(L), ∆ is Q-universal and Q-rich.
Lemma 1.16. Let ∆ be an L-consistent set of sentences of L. Then for some not-empty denumerable set C of new constants, there is a set Π of sentences of
By induction on h we see that if an existential sentence ∃xA(x) is in Π, then ⊥ ∈ Π, therefore no existential sentence is in Π. Let ∃xA(x) ∈ Π, for some A(x). Then by lemma 1.3(viii), ∃x(A(x)∧∀z 2 ...∀z h ⊥) ∈ Π, ∃x∀z 2 ...∀z h ⊥ ∈ Π, ∀z 2 ...∀z h ⊥ ∈ Π (from axiom A → ∀xA, where x does not occur in A), and so by induction hypothesis, ⊥ ∈ w contrary to the L-consistency of Π. Let Q = ∅. Trivially Π is ∅-universal and ∅-rich.
.. be an enumeration of all the existential sentences of L C . Define the following chain of sets of sentences of
. Suppose the set Γ n has already been defined and the constants of C occurring in Γ n are c 1 , ..., c k . Choose the first sentence in the given enumeration (and cancel it) which from C contains at most the constants c 1 , ..., c k . Let it be ∃xF (x).
C -consistent in virtue of lemma 1.15, and so is Cl(Γ n+1 ), consequently Γ is L C -consistent. Γ is C-universal because it includes Γ 0 , and C -rich for some C ⊆ C by construction, therefore Γ is C-rich by lemma 1.11(ii). In virtue of lemma 1.14, Γ can be extended to a set Π which is L C -maximal. Therefore Π is Q-universal and Q-rich for some Q ⊆ Const(L C ).
for L is defined as follows:
Let us check that every canonical model is based on a K-frame. If a logic L is consistent, then the empty set of sentences is L-consistent, so by lemma 1.16 there is an L C -saturated set of sentences for some set C of constants, therefore * with respect to which w is Q * -universal. Therefore w is Q-universal and Q-rich for some Q ⊆ D w , whence by lemma 1.11(ii) w is D w -rich.
(b) If ∀z 1 ...z h ⊥ ∈ w, for some h ≥ 1, then D w = ∅. For, if D w = ∅, then for some tautology (x) and constant c ∈ D w , ∀x¬ (x) → ¬ (c/x) ∈ w and so ∃x (x) ∈ w, contrary to the L w -consistency of w, as we saw in (a) of the proof of lemma 1.16.
, where x 1 , . . . , x n are all the variables occurring free in A.
Proof. For simplicity's sake we will write in the following A(σ(
Hence by induction hypothesis, B(σ(x 1 ), . . . , σ(x n )) / ∈ v, and so
. . , x n ). Before examining the case of the quantifiers, let us recall that in canonical models individual constants are rigid designators, for
If ∆ is an L-consistent set of formulas, then for some w ∈ W and some
Proof. (i) Let C = {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , ...} be a set of constants not occurring in L and z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , ... be all the variables occurring free in formulas of ∆. Then
The standard pattern to show that a logic L ⊇ Q
• .K is complete with respect to a class H of frames goes as follows. Take any wff A which is not a theorem of L, so {¬A} is L-consistent. By lemma 1.21(i), there is a world
L is based on a frame of H, then L is complete with respect to H. Now, lemma 1.19 allows us to build canonical models of the most general kind: nothing is said about the inner domains and the outer domains are increasing. In order to prove that M L is based on a frame of a given class H, we need to prove variations of lemma 1.19 to the effect that the inner and outer domains fulfill the specific conditions of the frames of H.
Actually, all the completeness proofs we shall present yield that the logics L under consideration are strongly complete, in fact we shall prove that every L-consistent set of wffs is satisfied on a model based on a frame for L.
Since no condition is required on frames for Q
• .K, lemma 1.19 yields Theorem 1.22. Q • .K is strongly complete with respect to the class of all Kframes.
Q • .K+CBF
The core fact to notice is that for any world w of a canonical model for
So individuals 'existing' at w, are bound to exist in all accessible worlds. The following lemma elaborates this fact. Lemma 1.23. Let w be a world of a canonical model for L ⊇ Q
• .K + CBF . 8 Hughes and Cresswell in [6] , pp.306-309, present, to our knowledge, the first completeness proof for a Kripke's style system, LP CK, without individual constants, characterized by the class of K-frames with varying not-empty domains (and outer increasing domains!). The present approach is more general and leads, as far as we can tell, to new completeness results such as those for 
If n ≥ 1, let z 1 . . . z n be variables not occurring in (*), so by the lemma 1.6(i),
this is the case when b ∈ c) and so it is a theorem of Q
• .K by lemma 1.3(ii), or is of the form ∀ z(∀xA( d, z, x) → A( d, z, d h /x)) for some h, 1 ≤ h ≤ m, (this is the case when b ∈ d) and so it is in 2 − (w), by lemma 1.23(ii). Hence
∀ z⊥, contrary to the hypothesis of the lemma.
Proof. As for lemma 1.19 provided that in lemma 1.16 at point (b), • .K + CBF is strongly complete with respect to the class of K-frames with increasing inner and outer domains.
Q.K
Consider the system Q.K obtained from Q
• .K by adding the axiom of Universal Instantiation. As is well known, CBF is a theorem of Q.K, 9 so by lemma 1.25, if wRv, D w ⊆ D v . Moreover, because of axiom U I, each w is U w -universal, consequently U w = D w , therefore Theorem 1.27. Q.K is strongly complete with respect to the class of T Kframes with increasing domains.
Let us now turn our attention to the Barcan Formula and consider canonical models for systems L ⊇ Q
• .K+CBF +BF . The core fact to notice is that for any world w of a canonical model for Proof. As for lemma 1.19 with C = ∅ and the set v constructed as follows. Let H 1 , H 2 , H 3 ... be an enumeration of all the existential sentences of L w . Define the following chain of sets of sentences of L w . Γ 0 = 2 − (w) ∪ {A}. Suppose the set Γ n has already been defined. Consider the sentence H n+1 . Let it be ∃xF (x).
Then let Γ = n∈N Cl(Γ n ). Extend Γ to a set v which is L w -maximal. The existence of a c ∈ D w such that Γ n+1 = Γ n ∪ {F (c/x)} is L w -consistent is guaranteed by the fact that otherwise Γ n ¬F (c/x) for all c ∈ D w . But Γ n is 2 − (w) united with a finite set of sentences, say, {A, B 1 , . . . B k }, so by lemma 1.28, Γ n ∀x¬F (x/c), contrary to the fact that
Theorem 1.30. Q
• .K + CBF + BF is strongly complete with respect to the class of K-frames with constant inner and outer domains.
Q.K + BF
Let L ⊇ Q.K + BF . Since Q.K CBF and each w is U w -universal thanks to U I, lemma 1.29 yields Theorem 1.31. Q.K + BF is strongly complete with respect to the class of T K-frames with constant domains. Theorems 1.22 and 1.26 can be improved to the effect that any model for Q
• .K (Q
• .K + CBF ) can be transformed into one with constant outer domains.
is strongly complete with respect to the class of K-frames with varying (increasing) inner domains and constant outer domains. Note The fact that the outer domains are constant, say they are equal to V , doesn't imply that V = w D w . Just consider a model for a set of sentences like {2⊥, ∀xP (x), ¬P (a)}. Therefore K-frames with constant outer domains differ, in general, from original Kripke frames.
The following table summarizes the completeness results obtained so far.
q.m.l.
is strongly complete w.r.t. the class of K-frames with domains inner outer
Modal systems with identity. We will start by examining the systems of the diagram below.
Let us add to Q
• .K the identity predicate ' = ' together with the following three axioms and let Q • = .K be the resulting system.
Lemma 2.1. Some theorems about identity. i
11 The system Q • = .K is often called in the literature F K, free quantified K.
(ii)
Again on rigidity In a language with identity the fact that a constant c is a rigid designator is expressed by the formula x = c → 2(x = c). Therefore, thanks to lemma 2.1(i), all the systems of q.m.l. with identity we are going to discuss are bound to be systems with rigid terms. Notice however that this is the case given general features of the K-semantics. The main feature is that universes of accessible worlds are related by the inclusion function: U w ⊆ U v . Therefore if we think of individuals of U v as counterparts of individuals of U w , each individual has one and only one counterpart in each related world (in fact it is the very same individual). It is because of this correlation that rigidity corresponds to N I or to the equivalence between de dicto and de re readings of substituted formulas, as pointed out in the footnote of lemma 1.1. For a more general semantics in which these notions are shown to be distinct from one another, see [2] . and (b) for all individual constants c, wRv implies I w (c) = I v (c).
Lemma 2.3. Each of the logics mentioned in the diagram at the beginning of this section is sound with respect to the class of normal K-models based on frames with respect to which the corresponding system without identity is sound.
As to canonical models for systems L ⊇ Q This can be achieved because each time we need to introduce a new constant c, we add that c is different from all the constants present so far.
It is easy to see that canonical models so defined are normal K-models. That W = ∅ is due, as before, to lemma 1.16. Each w is D w -universal thanks to lemma 2.1(iii). Condition (#) is trivially satisfied, so wRv implies that U w ⊆ U v and
Proof. As for lemma 1.19 with the set v constructed as follows. Let C be a countable set of new constants and let H 1 , H 2 , ... be an enumeration of all the existential sentences of L C w . Define the following chain of sets of sentences of L C w . Γ 0 = 2 − (w) ∪ {A}. Suppose the set Γ n has already been defined and the constants of C occurring in Γ n are c 1 , ..., c k . Choose the first sentence in the given enumeration (and cancel it) which from C contains at most the constants c 1 , ..., c k . Let it be ∃xF (x).
Then let Γ = n∈N Cl(Γ n ) and Q = {c : ∃y(y = c) ∈ Γ}. Extend Γ to a set v which is L Q w -maximal. Γ is Q-rich by construction and Q-universal because of lemma 2.1(iii), so is v. Let us show that condition (#) holds. In virtue of the way in which Γ has been defined, every constant occuring in formulas of Γ n+1 either belongs to Const(L w ) or has been introduced as a witness for an existential sentence containing no variables of C other than those occurring already in Γ n . In addition, v is L Q wmaximal, so no constants occur in v which do not occur also in Γ. It follows that
What remains to be proved is that Γ n+1 as defined in case 
The other cases are as in lemma 1.20.
K is strongly complete with respect to the class of normal K-models based on all K-frames with constant outer domains.
K+CBF is strongly complete with respect to the class of normal Kmodels based on all K-frames with increasing inner domains and constant outer domains. (iii) Q = .K is strongly complete with respect to the class of normal K-models based on T K-frames with increasing domains. 
K+CBF is complete w.r.to the class of all K-frames with increasing inner domains and, by the construction of theorem 1.32, with constant outer domains. (iii) follows from (ii) and the fact that Q = .K ∃y(y = c), for all constants c.
and moreover v is Q-universal and Q-rich for some Q ⊆ D w .
Proof. The proof is the same as that of lemma 1.29 except that, Case(1.)
We show that such a constant c is always available. Suppose not, then Γ n Lw ∃y(y = c) → ¬F (c), for all c ∈ D w . But Cl(Γ n ) is D w -inductive by lemma 1.28, so Γ n Lw ∀z(∃y(y = z) → ¬F (z/c)), where z does not occur in ¬F (c), then Γ n Lw ∀z∃y(y = z) → ∀z¬F (z), Γ n Lw ∀z¬F (z)), contrary to the 
K + BF is strongly complete with respect to the class of normal models based on K-frames with decreasing inner domains and constant outer domains.
K+CBF +BF is strongly complete with respect to the class of normal models based on K-frames with constant inner domains and constant outer domains.
(iii) Q = .K+BF is strongly complete with respect to the class of normal models based on T K-frames with constant domains.
Systems with the Extended Barcan Rule
By EBR, Extended Barcan Rule, we denote the set of all rules BR(n + 1), n ≥ 0. The rule EBR was first introduced by R. Thomason in [8] and since then discussed at various points in the literature.
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Lemma 2.12. EBR is valid on K-frames with constant outer domains, i.e. for any K-model M with constant outer domains, if the premise of EBR is valid on M, then the conclusion is also valid on M.
Proof. Suppose that for some M, w and w-assignment σ, M |=
. Since U w = U v , this is impossible because τ is also a w-assignment and, by hypothesis, M |=
If the outer domains of a given K-frame F are not constant, then it might well be that, e.g., BR(1) is valid on F (just take K-frames in which wRv implies D v ⊆ U w ) and BR (2) is not. Here is an instance in case. Let F = W, R, D, U ,
We can easily see that BR(1), i.e.
is valid on F. On the contrary, if M = F, I is such that
therefore the following instance of BR (2) is not valid on M:
Let us add EBR to the systems considered so far.
is equivalent to Q.K+EBR.
Proof. (a) If Q • .K A, then by theorem 1.32 for some K-model M with constant outer domains, M |= A, consequently, by lemma 2.12,
, therefore adding EBR to Q.K gives a stronger system: Q.K+BF . Consequently Q.K+EBR is complete with respect to T K-frames with constant domains.
The following table summarizes the results obtained so far for systems with identity.
is strongly complete w.r.t. the class of normal models based on K-frames with domains
As a matter of fact, the construction of canonical models for Q • .K as described in the first part of this paper, allows us to build models for Q
• .K with increasing outer domains and we do not know of any way of building canonical models for Q
• .K or Q • .K+EBR with constant outer domains. When identity is present, a second strategy, to be described below, is at our disposal and it provides us with canonical models with constant outer domains. Both strategies are needed since, for example, the completeness proof of Q = .K requires the first, whereas the completeness proof of Q 
Proof. Let H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , ... be an enumeration of all the sentences of L C which are either of the form ∃xF (x), for some wff F (x) or of the form A 0 ∧ 3(A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ 3(A n ∧ 3∃xA n+1 (x)) . . . ) for some wffs A 0 . . . A n+1 such that x is not free in A 0 . . . A n . Define the following chain of sets of sentences of L C . Γ 0 = ∆. Suppose the set Γ n = ∆ ∪ {B 1 , . . . , B k } has already been defined. Consider the sentence H n+1 in the given enumeration.
It is easy to see that Π is 3-rich, Q-rich and Q-universal, where Q = {c ∈ L C : ∃y(y = c) ∈ Π}. Now we show that in cases (1.1) and (1.2) the appropriate constant c is always available.
C . Therefore for some c which doesn't occur either in B = ( 3A n+1 (c/x) ) . . . ) → ⊥. Let z be a variable not occurring in this last formula, then
• W is the class of all L C -saturated and 2-L C -inductive set of sentences,
Lemmas 2.14 and 2.15 guarantee that W = ∅.
Proof. The proof is exactly as that of lemmas 1.19 and 1.16 except that,
We show that such a constant c is always available. Suppose not, then for all c ∈ L w , 2 − (w) G ∧ ∃y(y = c) → ¬F (c), where G is the conjunction of all the sentences of (Γ n − 2 − (w)), so w 2(G ∧ ∃y(
Lemmas 2.14-2.18 yield that Theorem 2.19. Q • = .K + EBR is strongly complete with respect to the class of normal models based on K-frames with constant outer domains.
Quantified extensions of the propositional modal logic B.
K) plus the propositional axiom B: A → 23A, i.e. the axiom characteristic of frames whose accessibility relation is symmetric. The rule EBR is derivable in Q
• .B. For the reader's sake, here is the proof of EBR as given in [6] , p.295, for n = 2. Proof. . Proof. That the accessibility relation R is symmetric is easily seen as for the propositional case because the languages of all the worlds of a given canonical model are equal.
(a) Since Q
• .B+CBF BF , the completeness proof of Q • .B + CBF is analogous to that for Q
• .K+CBF +BF . For the reader's sake here is the proof of BF as given in [3] , p.138. 
Q
• .B+BF is K-incomplete
Here is a model for Q • .B+BF in which CBF fails. 14 The model is based on a counterpart Kripke frame. For details about counterpart semantics, see [2] . A counterpart Kripke frame, CK-frame, is a quintuple F = W, R, D, U, C , where W, R, D, U is a K-frame and C, the counterpart relation, is such that C = df w,v∈W {C w,v }, where for any w, v ∈ W such that wRv, C w,v ⊆ (U w × U v ).
It can be easily shown that Q
• .K formulated in a language with types is valid with respect to the class of all CK-models, where the notion of satisfaction is defined thus: a 1 , ..., a n |= w P n (n : x 1 , . . . , x n ) iff a 1 , ..., a n ∈ I w (P n ) a 1 , ..., a n |= w n : s 1 , ..., s k B iff a 1 , ..., a n [n : s 1 , ..., s k ] w |= w B a 1 , ..., a n |= w ¬C iff a 1 , ..., a n |= w C a 1 , ..., a n |= w C ∨ D iff a 1 , ..., a n |= w C or a 1 , ..., a n |= w D a 1 , ..., a n |= w ∃x n+1 G iff for some b ∈ D w , a 1 , ..., a n , b |= w G a 1 , ..., a n |= w 2C iff for all v such that wRv and for all counterparts a * 1 , . . . , a * n in D v of a 1 , . . . , a n , respectively, a * 1 , ..., a * n |= v C. A counterpart frame is said to be symmetric iff both R and C are symmetric. A counterpart relation is said to be surijective iff if wRv, then for all b ∈ U v there is an a ∈ U w such that aCb holds. From [2] we know that BF is valid on a counterpart K-frame iff the counterpart relation is surijective. Both R and C are symmetric relations and C is surijective, so F is a frame for Q • .B+BF . Consider now a model M = F, I such that I w (P ) = {a, b} and I v (P ) = {a * }. Then M |= w 2∀xP (x) because a * ∈ I v (P ) and M |= w ∀x2P (x) because bCb * and b * / ∈ I v (P ), so M |= w 2∀xP (x) → ∀x2P (x). Therefore Q
• .B+BF CBF . But CBF is valid on all K-frames for Q • .B+BF since each of them is bound to have inner constant domains, whence Theorem 2.22. Q
• .B+BF is not characterized by any class of K-frames.
Open problems Completeness property of Q • .K+BF and Q • .B.
